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Coordinating International Standards:  
The Formation of the ISO1 
 
JoAnne Yates (MIT Sloan School) and Craig N. Murphy (Wellesley College) 
 
 
 In the article on “Standardization” in the 14th edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, 
Paul Gough Agnew, the long-time Secretary of the American Standards Association (ASA), 
argued: 
In the flow of products from farm, forest, mine, and sea through processing and 
fabricating plants, and through wholesale and retail markets to the ultimate consumer, 
most difficulties are met at the transition points––points at which the product passes 
from department to department within a company, or is sold by one company to 
another or to an individual. The main function of standards is to facilitate the flow of 
products through these transition points. Standards are thus both facilitators and 
integrators. In smoothing out points of difficulty, or “bottlenecks,” they provide the 
evolutionary adjustments which are necessary for industry to keep pace with technical 
advances. They do this in the individual plant, in particular industries, and in industry 
at large. They are all the more effective as integrators in that they proceed by simple 
evolutionary steps, albeit inconspicuously.2 
 
Albeit inconspicuous, standard setting has been among the nuts and bolts of globalizing 
industrial capitalism since its beginning, assuring that things needing to work together fit 
from product to product, industry to industry, and country to country. The foci of the first 
two of the now 229 “technical committees” of the non-specialized international standards 
organizations that emerged after the two world wars—the interwar International Standards 
Association [ISA] and the post-World War II International Organization for Standardization 
[ISO]—are iconic: “Screw Threads” and “Bolts, Nuts and Accessories.” Over the past two 
decades, voluntary standardization processes, invented by turn-of-the-twentieth-century 
engineers working in national and international technical committees, have increasingly been 
                                                
1 We would like to thank Madame Beatrice Frey at ISO for her help in providing us access to original 
documents from UNSCC and ISO, and Stacy Leistner at ANSI for his help in providing access to the minutes 
from AESC and ASA meetings. 
2 Quoted as epigraph of Dickson Reck, ed., National Standards in a Modern Economy, (New York, 1956), v. 
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applied to issues that have little in common with those of fitting one mechanical part to 
another, such as work processes (ISO 9000), environmental pollution (ISO 14,000), and 
human rights (SA 8000 and the planned ISO 26000).3 This rapidly expanding scope, plus the 
high visibility of standards in networked areas such as telecommunications, has led to a new 
scholarly interest in standard setting practices.4   
ISO and ISA, like much of the institutional architecture of twentieth-century standard 
setting, are part of a relatively under-studied and under-theorized realm of institutions that 
have helped shape the modern global economy.  They are similar to the professional and 
trade associations, whose interests are fundamentally different from those of any single firm, 
and to other voluntary transnational organizations (e.g., Amnesty International), which have 
a kind of power, but one that gains its legitimacy from something fundamentally different 
than the sovereign state. 
Business and economic historians have begun to differentiate the wide array of 
economic coordination mechanisms that exist along the dimension from “market” to 
                                                
3 On the extension of ISO-style standard setting into new realms see, Kristiana Tamm Hallström, “International 
Standardization Backstage: Legitimacy and Competition in the Social Responsibility Field,” prepared for the 
Stockholm Centre for Organizational Research conference, Organizing the world: rules and rule-setting among 
organizations, Stockholm, 13-15 Oct. 2005, and Jennifer Clapp, “The Privatization of Global Environmental 
Governance: ISO 14000 and the Developing World,” Global Governance 4:3 (1998), 295-316. 
4 In international relations see, for example, Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe, “Setting International Standards: 
Technological Rationality or the Primacy of Power?,” World Politics, 56 (Oct. 2003): 1-42; and Jennifer Clapp, 
“The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and the Developing World.” Global 
Governance 4:3 (1998): 295-316.  In sociology, see Thomas A. Loya and John Boli,  “Standardization in the 
World Polity: Technical Rationality over Power,” in John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds., Constructing 
World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1975, (Stanford, CA, 1999), 169-97.  In 
political science, see Samuel Krislov, How Nations Choose Product Standards and Standards Change Nations 
(Pittsburgh, PA, 1967).  In social studies of science and technology, see Tineke Egyedi, “Shaping 
Standardization - A study of standards processes and standard policies in the field of telematic services,” Ph.D. 
Thesis, 1996, Delft Technical University.  In history, see Andrew L. Russell, “Standardization in History: A 
Review Essay with an Eye to the Future,” in Sherrie Bolin, ed., The Standards Edge: Future Generations (Ann 
Arbor, MI, 2005), 247-260;  Amy Slaton and Janet Abbate, “The Hidden Lives of Standards: Technical 
Prescriptions and the Transformation of Work in America, in Michael Thad Allen and Gabrielle Hecht, eds., 
Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes (Cambridge, 
MA, 2001), 95-143. 
4 
“hierarchy,”5 and clearly ASA, ISO, and similar organizations can readily be understood as 
falling somewhere between the extremes. Yet standardization, per se, can be accomplished 
by institutions that lie anywhere along the line. Naomi Lamoreaux and her colleagues 
observe that, “Coordination mechanisms from one part of our scale can sometimes be made 
more effective by combining them with devices from other parts.”6 Similarly, early advocates 
of ISO-like standard setting argued that the process would improve both the efficiency of 
markets and the success of firms. Moreover, this national and international process, while 
certainly not exclusively or even primarily governmental, involved national interests and 
even government bodies in greater or lesser ways. 
 The political scientists, economists, and sociologists who have theorized about the 
development of international standardization reflect the biases of their fields, the political 
scientists overemphasizing the power of the state and the differences created by different 
state structures; the economists, individual (rational) firms with more or less complete 
information making decisions within markets; and the sociologists, the impact of an 
emergent global culture.7 Traditionally, historians of technology have tended to focus their 
work on national engineering institutions and professional societies in particular technical 
arenas.8 It is worthwhile to take a broader historical look at trends in standardization globally 
by considering the records created by national (in this case American) and international 
                                                
5 See, especially, Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, “Beyond Markets and 
Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History,” American Historical Review 108 (April 
2003): 404-33. 
6 Ibid., 409. 
7 Mattli and Büthe, “Setting International Standards,” reports on and contributes to the work in political science, 
and critiques sociologists Loya and Boli’s “Standardization in the World Polity.”  For  an economic approach, 
see, for example, Stanley M. Besen and Joseph Farrell, “Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in 
Standardization” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 8:2 (Spring, 1994), 117-131. 
8 E.g., Bruce Sinclair, “At the Turn of a Screw: William Sellers, the Franklin Institute, and a Standard American 
Thread,” Technology and Culture 10 (Jan., 1969), 20-34; Sinclair, A Centennial History of the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers: 1880-1980 (Toronto, 1980). 
5 
standardizing institutions at the time that they formed. Even if we accept that complex 
pressures toward globalization have existed throughout the history of capitalist industrialism, 
and that the larger market areas associated with each new wave of lead industries have been 
supported by international standard setting, those recurrent pressures tell us little about the 
sequence and timing of the standardizing institutions that might appear in any particular era 
in any particular part of the world.9 
Local and national standardizing efforts were underway in the United States and other 
countries by the turn of the twentieth century.  In 1901, several British engineering societies 
founded the Engineering Standards Committee (later the British Engineering Standards 
Association, BESA), the first of the private voluntary national standardizing associations 
(“the oldest body of its kind in the world and the model for standards associations in many 
other countries”10) as a site for cooperation among scientists, engineers, firms, and 
associations.  In 1918, the American Engineering Standards Committee (AESC, which 
became the ASA, and later ANSI, the American National Standards Institute) was established 
on its model, with an explicit policy of using a voluntary, consensus approach to establishing 
American industrial standards.  
No such general body yet existed to foster international standards at the time the 
AESC was founded, but standardizing activity around specific network technologies such as 
railroads, telegraph, and electricity had occurred across countries, complementing 
intergovernmental work on weights and measures, money, banking transactions, and various 
                                                
9 Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850, 
(Oxford, UK, 1994), 92-93, 196-97, and “Globalization and Governance: A Historical Perspective,” in Roland 
Axtmann, ed., Globalization in Europe, (London, 1998), 144-67. 
10 Edward R. Weidlein and Vera Reck, “A Million Years of Standards,” in Dickson Reck, ed., National 
Standards in a Modern Economy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 20. 
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areas of public administration.11 As early as 1906, the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) was established with the lofty goal of standardizing the nomenclature and 
ratings around electrical devices worldwide. Although it covered only a single (if broad) 
domain, this organization represented a significant advance in international standardization 
and developed many of the institutional structures and processes that survive even today.  In 
1926 the first general international standardizing body, the ISA (International Federation of 
the National Standardizing Associations) was established on the model of the IEC, with 
AESC, then ASA, representing the U.S.  In spite of its name, it was never truly international, 
with its member associations representing primarily the countries of continental Europe (the 
“metric bloc”). The most important so-called “inch” countries (the U.S. and Great Britain) 
never fully participated, and consequently its work had a relatively limited direct effect on 
international industry and trade.  Nevertheless, its indirect effect was important, since many 
of the standardizing procedures and committees it established would be reborn in the ISO.  
Only at the end of World War II was a truly international standardizing body of broad scope, 
ISO, created. 
By what process did this comprehensive global standardization body finally take 
form?  Many of the processes and institutional structures for international standardization 
were established in the domain-restricted IEC before the wars.  At the end of the first world 
                                                
11In fact, the original network of late nineteenth century intergovernmental organizations and their successors, 
the “Specialized Agencies” of the League of Nations and then the United Nations were––and sometimes still 
are––referred to as “standard setting agencies.”  One of the recent important studies that maintains that usage is 
the UK Department for International Development’s controversial assessment of the effectiveness of different 
multilateral agencies, which distinguishes operational development and humanitarian agencies that provide 
direct services, such as UNICEF, from the older “standard setting agencies” (e.g., the International Labour 
Organisation and World Health Organization) which also now provide direct services other than the 
promulgation of standards, their original purpose (Alison Scott, “Assessment of Multilateral Organisational 
Effectiveness,” International Division Advisory Department, Department for International Development, 
unpublished paper dated 1 June 2005).  
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war, and spurred by the desire to transcend that conflict, the vision of such a body existed in 
the minds of the major standard setters in the less-internationalist “inch countries.”  
Nonetheless, tensions within and among nations, technical and trade associations, and firms 
all delayed progress until the beginning of World War II suspended that organization (as well 
as the IEC) entirely.  After the war, the national standards communities felt the desire for 
international cooperation even more strongly, and at this point, with models already available 
to draw on, they succeeded in creating a more effective international standardizing body—
the ISO. 
In what follows we first briefly discuss the establishment of the IEC and the AESC, 
then two waves of general international standardization in the wake of the two world wars, 
culminating in the formation of the ISA and the ISO, the second of which succeeded much 
better than the first.  Key themes emerge from this narrative and are drawn together in the 
conclusion. 
 
The Formation of the IEC and AESC: Early International and U.S. Standardization  
 Howard Coonley, at various times President of ISO, ASA, and the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the largest industrial trade association in the U.S., 
retrospectively described the beginnings of the international standards movement in this way: 
While the British Engineering Standards Association was in smooth operation prior to 
the First World War, until then it was the only national standards agency in existence. 
World War I gave the impetus to national standardization in all countries involved in 
that struggle and at the same time established the need of an international standards 
movement.12 
 
                                                
12 Howard Coonley, “The International Standards Movement,” in Reck, National Standards, 37. 
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The state of national and international standardization in specific technical domains, rather 
than broadly conceived, was not this bleak before World War I.  Various national scientific 
and technical associations formed in the second half of the 19th century included 
standardizing in their mandates, and international Congresses and Commissions, including 
the still-surviving IEC, undertook standardization on the international level.  Nevertheless, 
the first world war clearly provided an impetus to broad standardization movements in both 
the national and international arenas.  In 1918, five American professional associations came 
together to form the first private and general standards-setting organization in the U.S.—the 
American Engineering Standards Committee—and in less than a decade, the first 
international organization with a broad standardization agenda—the International Standards 
Association—was formed.  Both drew on some of the institutional structures that had already 
been developed within narrower technical domains, particularly that of electricity.   
 In 1861, the British Association for the Advancement of Science had established a 
Committee on Standards of Electrical Resistance with a mandate to develop standard 
measurement units related to telegraphy and other electrical phenomena that would be 
broadly accepted.13  Electrotechnical associations soon began to be formed, in Britain in 
1871 (Britain’s Society of Telegraph Engineers, soon to become the Institution of Electrical 
Engineers, or IEE) and then in several other countries during the 1880s and 1890s (France, 
Austro-Hungary, the U.S., Canada, Germany, Italy).14  Beginning in 1881 (even before 
national electrical associations were formed anywhere but in Britain), a series of 
                                                
13 Lary Randles Lagerstrom, “Constructing uniformity: The standardization of international electrmagnetic 
measures, 1860-1912,” doctoral dissertation in history, University of California, Berkeley, 1992.   
14 Mark Frary, “The World of Electricity: 1820-1904,” in 100 Years of the IEC (IEC, 2006) on the website of 
the International Electrotechnical Commission, http://www.iec.ch/100years/articles/world_of_electricity.htm , 
accessed 7/12/2006. 
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International Electrical Congresses were held among representatives of the different national 
scientific and engineering communities to standardize electrical units.  The initial Congress 
was followed by several others, at each of which the discussions (and sometimes conflicts) 
over standard units continued. The 1904 International Electrical Congress in St. Louis passed 
a resolution calling for the establishment of an ongoing international commission to serve as 
the institutional mechanism for such activity.15  At least two different developments occurred 
in the wake of this Congress.  A small and relatively informal group composed primarily of 
scientists representing the national physical laboratories continued to work on bringing 
precision and consistency to the system of electrical units at several International 
Conferences on Electrical Units in subsequent years, wrapping up most of its work at the 
London International Conference in 1908, with a follow-up “Working Meeting on Electrical 
Standards” in Washington, D.C. in 1910.16  The group did not become an ongoing 
international organization; in fact, the scientists who reached those agreements found that 
their work was temporarily facilitated by limiting discussion to fellow-scientists at the new 
national laboratories that existed in only a handful of countries, thus abandoning the more 
inclusive decision-making procedures followed by most of the 19th century international 
conferences that created the precursors of today’s intergovernmental organizations.17 
Meanwhile, a group of engineers representing professional and commercial (rather than 
purely scientific) interests responded more directly to the call, with the oldest of the 
electrotechnical societies, the British IEE, aided by its American counterpart, undertaking the 
                                                
15 Frary, “The Founding of the IEC,” in 100 Years of the IEC, at http://www.iec.ch/100years/articles/founding-
iec.htm , accessed 7/12/2006. 
16 Lagerstrom, “Constructing Uniformity,” pp. 245-317 and Appendix 1. 
17 This is one of Lagerstrom’s central conclusions. On the 19th century international conference system as the 
mechanism for creating intergovernmental organizations see, Murphy, International Organization and 
Industrial Change, pp. 71-81. 
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organizing work to form (and thus putting its stamp on) the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC).  The IEC became the first permanent international organization for 
industrial standardization, though in a restricted domain. 
 The IEC pioneered many of the techniques and institutional mechanisms that came to 
typify voluntary consensus standard setting, including the ongoing involvement of engineers 
and representatives of private companies in the discussion of technical standards within their 
fields.  The inclusiveness of the first IEC meeting was facilitated by some of the peculiarities 
of the new “high-technology” field that linked businessmen, scientists, and engineers across 
countries. The chair of the first meeting was Alexander Siemens, a British citizen, head of the 
British division of the German company Siemans, and the nephew of the “electrician” (the 
telegraph engineer) Werner von Siemens, who founded the parent company and had been at 
the center of the debates about measurements of electricity since the 1860s.  Japan’s delegate 
was Ichisuke Fujioka, “the Father of Electricity of Japan” and founder of Toshiba. Thus, 
although engineers (many of whom were professors of engineering) and a few scientists were 
also involved, a major concern of the first meeting was assuring “that manufacturing interests 
should be represented on the Local Committees.”18 
 Other institutional mechanisms emerged at the IEC’s founding meeting in 1906.  One 
was what Lagerstrom has referred to as “the principle of the subcommittee.”19   The 
                                                
18 The quotation is from, “1981 …A Year of Anniversaries,” IEC Bulletin, 15, 67(January 1981): 4. The 
members and minutes of the first meeting are in, International Electrotechnical Committee, “Report of 
Preliminary Meeting Held at the Hotel Cecil, London, on Tuesday and Wednesday, June 26th and 27th 1906,” 
(London: IEC, 1906). The discussion of the decisions made in that first meeting (in the next two paragraphs of 
the text, above) is based on this report/minutes.  On Fujioka, see “Ichisuke Fujioka: A Wizard with Electricity,” 
http://www.toshiba.co.jp/spirit/en/ichisuke/index.html, accessed 7/19/2006..  
19 Lagerstrom, “Constructing Uniformity,” p. 315.  He enunciates the principle as follows: “The appointment of 
a sub-committee to make a decision for a larger group on the one hand limits the subjective, personal element 
by reducing the number of people who have a say, and on the other allows greater reign to the personal 
judgment of the subcommittee members, in both cases increasing the likelihood of a decision being reached.”  
11 
organizers from the British IEE had drafted a set of proposed rules for the new organization 
and circulated it to the 33 delegates from 13 countries before the meeting, and delegates had 
raised several issues and proposed some amendments before the opening meeting.  After 
Chairman Siemans catalogued these suggestions, C. O. Mailloux, part of the American 
delegation and a member and future president of the AIEE, suggested appointing a 
subcommittee to consider the rules and amendments and to make a recommendation to the 
entire group: 
Mr. Mailloux (U. S. A.) ventured to think it would be an unwise proceeding to adopt 
the Rules en bloc before the Delegates had had sufficient time for their consideration; 
he himself had not had an opportunity as yet of considering the amendments 
proposed.  He mentioned that in discussing the whole question of the proposed 
Commission, quite informally, with some of the Delegates he found that some 
difference of opinion existed.  In order that the Commission might work 
harmoniously and accomplish the greatest measure of good, it would, he thought, be 
necessary to proceed with great caution and deliberation in drafting these Rules, so 
that there might be no criticisms later on as to the intention of the Commission, 
which, he felt sure they would all agree with him, was to further the interests of the 
electrical industry of the world.  He, therefore, suggested that a Sub-Committee with 
one Representative from each country should forthwith be appointed to consider the 
Rules seriatim and report to the whole Commission. 
 
Recognizing that a smaller subcommittee could more readily reach a decision than the larger 
group, and that it was advisable to proceed “with great caution and deliberation” to prevent 
future acrimony, the delegates immediately agreed and the subcommittee commenced work.  
                                                                                                                                                  
He sees this principle as explaining the limitation of negotiations over units primarily to the national 
laboratories in the less formal conferences that followed the 1904 Congress, and as being part of what allowed 
“the transformation of the local into the universal and the subjective into the objective” (pp. 314-315).  But the 
general principle that a smaller subcommittee can more readily reach a decision is clearly applicable to the 
formation of the IEC itself, and it its ongoing decision-making. 
12 
Another IEC organizing structure introduced a few years later—the technical committee 
(TC)—also reflected the subcommittee principle.20   
 After agreeing on the IEC’s mission (standardizing nomenclature and ratings of 
electrical apparatus and machinery), the subcommittee worked its way through the proposed 
rules and amendments to create basic operating procedures, some of which would shape 
subsequent international standards organizations.  Although each country would have a 
single vote, thus giving it international legitimacy, it was not an intergovernmental 
organization.  Each country would be represented by a local committee formed by that 
country’s technical societies or, if a country did not yet have a relevant technical society, 
appointed by the government.  The voluntary consensus approach was built into the rules, as 
decisions would be published as those of the IEC only when passed unanimously; split 
decisions would be published only with the names of countries voting for and against them.  
The IEC’s central office, to support which the local committees would contribute equally, 
would initially be in the IEE offices in London, reflecting that body’s formative influence.  A 
President and Honorary Secretary would be elected; these two individuals plus two delegates 
from each member country’s local committee would comprise a Council that conducted 
business, by correspondence or in meetings.  The President could call a meeting of the 
Council and/or of the entire Commission when desirable.  Local committees would pay their 
own expenses and contribute equally to the central office.   
 Some of these same principles and institutional structures, drawn in part from the 
British and American electrotechnical associations and manifested internationally in the IEC, 
                                                
20 In 1911, TC 1 was established to deal with matters of terminology and definition in the electrotechnical 
domain (background section of Strategic Policy Statement for IEC TC1, at http://www.iec.ch/cgi-
bin/getsps.pl/1.pdf?file=1.pdf, accessed 7/16/2006). 
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would be adopted in the first American general standards setting organization, the American 
Engineering Standards Committee (AESC).  The AESC was formed in 1918 by the 
professional associations of civil, electrical, mechanical, and mining engineers and the 
American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM). At the first meeting, the five organizations 
agreed, “after lengthy discussion of the subject,” to invite representatives of U.S. Navy, War, 
and Commerce Departments to join the organization.21  At the same meeting, the 
representatives of the five associations approved a draft “Constitution” and “Rules of 
Procedure” that outlined both the justification for establishing national standards and the 
mechanisms by which they would be created. 22  
From the beginning, members wanted to establish the legitimacy of this non-
governmental organization and its standard-setting processes.  The draft constitution’s 
preamble asserted: 
At the present time many bodies are engaged in the formulation of standards. There is 
no uniformity in the rules for such procedure in the different organizations; in some 
cases the committees engaged in the work are not fully representative; and in a 
considerable proportion of cases they do not consult all the allied interests.23 
 
What would become Sections 6 and 7 of the final Rules of Procedure24 addressed the 
representativeness of standard-setting committees, and, hence, the legitimacy of the resulting 
standards. AESC standards-making committees dealing with “standards of a commercial 
character (specifications, shop practices, etc.)” would become “fully representative” by being 
“made up of representatives of producers, consumers and general interests, no one of these 
                                                
2114 May 1918, Minutes, American Engineering Standards Committee (AESC), p. 1 (page numbers provided 
until sequential numbering of minutes begins in March 1919; after that, we indicate minute number with #).  
The National Bureau of Standards [NBS], in charge of the U.S. system of weights and measurement, was under 
the Department of Commerce. 
22 Included as appendices to 14 May 1918, Minutes, AESC. 
23 Ibid., p. 1 of the first appendix. 
24 Originally they were parts a and b of Section 3 of the draft. 
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interests to form a majority.”  At this time, “consumers” and “producers” were largely 
understood as consuming and producing companies; it would take much longer before 
individual consumers were explicitly brought into the picture. “General interests include 
independent engineers, educators, and persons who are neither consumers nor producers, as 
defined above.”  The “general interest” groups would be especially important in less 
commercial realms: 
Sectional Committees dealing with standards, of a scientific or non-commercial 
character shall consist of persons specifically qualified, without regard to their 
affiliation.  
 
These technical committees, following IEC precedent, became the primary mechanism 
through which voluntary standards would be developed.25  A May 1919 amendment to the 
draft constitution assured that the role of the overall “Committee,” the organization’s 
“government,” would be limited to the “approval” of standards developed through these 
mechanisms.26 
As World War I wound down, the representatives of the engineering associations and 
government debated both the draft documents and three larger visions of what a national 
standards agency should be. One group wanted the government to take the central role. In 
January 1919, AESC Chairman Comfort A. Adams, Professor of Electrical Engineering at 
Harvard and his society’s representative, reported to his colleagues that the National Bureau 
of Standards Director, Samuel W. Stratton, had written to say that  
…it was his desire that the Bureau be the standardizing body for the nation and that in 
his opinion the American Engineering Standards Committee should act in an advisory 
capacity to the Bureau, but that if this arrangement was not agreeable he would accept 
                                                
25 For discussion of this mechanism and the principal of voluntary standards, see David Hemenway, 
Industrywide Voluntary Product Standards (Cambridge, MA, 1975). 
26 17 May 1919, Minutes, AESC, #123.  
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our invitation and join in the work of the Committee according to our Constitution 
and Rules of Procedure.27 
 
A second group, including the Chairman, advocated opening the organization to all of the 
professional associations, trade associations, and even individual firms that either produced 
or used standards.  Most of the other representatives of the engineering societies were aghast.  
One asked: 
“How large would this American Standards Association be?” 
“About one thousand,” replied Professor Adams. 
“If that were the case it would be impossible to arrive at any conclusions.”28 
 
Initially, a third view came to dominate: AESC should slowly add additional 
“cooperating societies” that shared the five original members’ “general” (i.e., non-
commercial) interest in standard setting. Yet, the rapidity with which new organizations 
(trade associations as well as professional organizations) and even firms were actually 
admitted to the AESC reflected the eventual triumph of Adam’s vision. 
In part, this proved a practical necessity. In 1918, Adams had stressed the importance 
of having the ultimate users of standards at the table, interested, and willing to pay for the 
often expensive work of standard setting, although another representative “expressed the 
vigorous opinion that this Committee should not consider the proposed reorganization on the 
grounds of financial support alone.”29 Recurrent financial difficulties marked the early 
history of the U.S. standards agency, however, and attempts to mitigate them through 
measures short of giving most standards producers and consumers a place at the table failed. 
When AESC turned to private foundations, in 1921, the Carnegie Corporation’s James R. 
                                                
27 17 Jan. 1919, Minutes, AESC, p. 1.  
28 18 Jan. 1919, Minutes, AESC, p. 3. 
29 1 March 1919, Minutes, AESC, #69. 
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Angell wrote back, “The work ought to be carried out by the industries.”30 A simultaneous 
scheme to convince industrial firms to give voluntary financial contributions almost cost 
more than it raised.  The Committee’s Secretary Paul Agnew, just back from a trip to Europe, 
reported that the European way of funding national standards bodies was through dues paid 
by trade associations and firms who acted as members, adding further support to this view.31 
In part, the eventual embrace of Adams’s vision may have been a consequence of his 
ability to convince his colleagues that the failure of the standards movement (due to lack of 
funding or to the lack of legitimacy of proposed standards) would spell disaster in other 
arena, such as labor. The minutes of one meeting in early 1919 record: 
Prompted by the remarks of some members of the Committee as to the limitation of 
the field of our work strictly to engineering standards, Chairman Adams pointed out 
the close relation which standardization in general bears to the present labor situation. 
Since the statement throws a new light on the discussion at hand it is given below in 
full. 
 
“The industrial labor situation is no theoretical matter, but a vital one to every one of 
us. We are faced with a situation in which labor is beginning to feel its power, and it 
has power if it organizes in a democratic country. It is my opinion, that with our 
present productive capacity per man, (all industries considered), it is impossible to 
raise the wages of all occupations up to the point of the best paid ones today, even 
taking into account the skill involved. Put in another way, the productive capacity of 
the individual, on the average, is not sufficient to create the wealth he wishes as a 
return for his labor. We must either face the possibility of a Bolshevik movement in 
this country or devise some means for increasing the average productivity of labor. 
This can be done by cooperation and standardization, which go hand in hand. 
 
[“]If anyone looks at the present situation critically, and sees it in the right 
perspective, he realizes the chaotic condition of the creation of standards in this 
country. The number of bodies involved is many and various. All kinds of methods 
are employed, some of them crude and unsatisfactory, some of them commercial. 
 
[“]I think you cannot fail to see the tremendous possibility and value to all industries, 
and to the nation as a whole, of this work of standardization.  It is not outside the field 
                                                
30 2 June 1921, Minutes, AESC, #534. 
31 15 September 1921, Minutes, AESC, #540. 
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of this Committee to attempt to do this work.  If we can get in these other 
organizations, the textile industry and the others as well, and inject into their working 
plans of organization the idea which we have evolved here of thorough, broad and 
comprehensive co-operation in the production of standards, I think we will have 
accomplished one of the biggest jobs which has ever been undertaken in this country. 
It would to more to solve the present problems of the United States than anything else 
we could do.”32 
 
Thus, he argued, potential labor unrest could be quelled by the high incomes made possible 
by the rapid increases in productivity that effective industrial standards would encourage.  In 
1922, Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, one of the most important advocates of scientific 
rationalization through voluntary cooperation of trade associations and professional 
societies,33 addressed the expanding AESC board with a similar productivity-based 
argument, but for him, the maintenance of the U.S. export position was the ultimate object.34  
An even grander argument had been heard three years earlier, when, just a month 
after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the head of the British Engineering Standards 
Association (BESA), Charles Le Maistre, came to New York to address the fledgling AESC. 
In 1901, at age 25, Le Maistre had become the first Secretary of BESA’s predecessor, the 
Engineering Standards Committee, and 1906 the first General Secretary of the IEC.35 In 
1919, he told the Americans, “. . . if we can bring together the engineers of the English-
speaking races, it will shortly be one of the greatest helps towards the peace of the world.”36 
He argued for Anglo-American and worldwide cooperation among standardization bodies. 
Adams responded to Le Maistre’s address by saying that his British colleague’s remarks, 
                                                
32 1 March 1919, Minutes, AESC, #70. 
33 See Ellis W. Hawley, “Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat , and the Vision of an Associative State,” 
The Journal of American History 61 (Jan. 1974): 116-40. 
34 15 June 1922, Minutes, AESC. 
35 IEC, “Charles Le Maistre,” dated March 2006, found on the Internet at: 
http://www.iec.ch/online_news/etech/arch_2006/etech_0306/news.htm#top. 
36 15 Aug. 1919, [Transcript of the] Committee Meeting of the American Engineering Standards Committee, p. 
6 (minutes were not numbered in this transcript, so page numbers are used, instead). 
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“have served, I think, the purpose which I have in mind.” Adams returned to his theme of 
increasing the productivity of labor in order to provide rising incomes, and of the role of 
standardization in that larger process: 
…it seems to me that it is almost a crime that work of this sort should be blocked by 
what would seem, ––and again I speak very frankly––to be narrow or small group 
interests. We have a job to do, something that is bigger than any one of the 
component cooperating units with which we are concerned, and we should, while 
serving of course our constituents as best we can, see first of all the task in hand and 
its importance and try to so order our work that it may be as effective as possible.37 
 
Le Maistre’s visit helped secure the agreement of all AESC members to the principle, 
in Adams’s words, “that the admission of other societies is desirable,”38 but agreement on the 
desirability of cooperation beyond the “narrow or small” interest of one nation would take 
longer.  For example, less than three months after Le Maistre’s address, the AESC decided 
that it had no power to act in response to a request from the International Aircraft Standards 
Commission (IASC) that the U.S. set up a corresponding U.S. Commission.  In this field 
(unlike in any other field it discussed), the AESC argued that the issue would have to be 
taken up by Congress before it would be able to act.39  Perhaps the AESC’s decision had 
something to do with the fact that the IASC grew out of the pre-war Franco-German 
international aviation regime (in which Britain and the U.S. did not participate).40  Moreover, 
                                                
37 Ibid, p. 22. 
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40 Kenneth W. Colegrove, International Control of Aviation, (Boston, 1930), 50-51. Aircraft standards remained 
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Le Maistre had made a particular point of the desirability of Anglo-American agreement that 
would build on the British experience in aviation standards.41 
In 1921 and 1923, the Committee sent Paul Agnew to European conferences of the 
general secretaries of all the European national standards associations, including that of 
Germany.42  Then, from 1923 through 1925, AESC encouraged the development of 
standardization associations throughout Latin America.43  At the third postwar “informal 
conference of the national standards bodies” held in Europe in 1925,44 the associations 
agreed to hold a further meeting in 1926.  The agenda would include forming a more 
permanent body linking the national standards associations.  In January and February1926, 
AESC debated Le Maistre’s ambitious draft proposal for a federation whose secretariat 
would collect and publish standards in both English and French and in both English and 
metric units. The Americans agreed that the time was ripe, but that Le Maistre was putting 
too much emphasis on the creation of international standards rather than the exchange of 
standards that had been developed within separate countries.45  Thus they worked to modify 
the ISA draft constitution to reflect a focus on coordinating national standards, rather than 
setting international standards. 
                                                
41 1 Nov. 1919, Minutes, AESC, #168.  In any event, immediately after deciding not to pursue international 
cooperation on aviation standards through the existing body, “The use of the term ‘Anglo-American’ was 
discussed and the Committee expressed the wish that in all correspondence the term ‘international’ be used in 
the place of ‘Anglo-American.’” 
42 12 March 1921, Minutes, AESC, #438; 12 Sept. 1923, Minutes, AESC, #1062. 
43 The report of the AESC representative to the first Pan-American Conference on Standardization (held in 
1925), offered some cautious words about what could be expected, emphasizing, “…the importance of an 
understanding of the fundamental differences in the two civilizations [present in America] and in the cultural 
background from which they developed.  Such an understanding would be necessary in any active cooperation 
in standardization matters.  The Anglo-Saxons were chiefly concerned with and interested in processes and 
results. The Latin peoples and Latin-American’s in particular cared less for industrial processes and results, but 
were more interested in artistic and emotional side of cultural and industrial development” (19 April 1925, 
Minutes, AESC, #1356). 
44 It was in fact the third, but it was designated as the “second,” because the meeting of 1921 was not considered 
formal enough to be called an “informal conference,” 25 Nov. 1925, Minutes, AESC, #1446. 
45 12 Jan. and 11 Feb. 1926, Minutes, AESC, #1533 and #1554. 
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The International Federation of National Standardization Associations (ISA) 
ISA’s constitution as adopted organized its work through technical committees like those of 
the IEC, each covering a different field and representing all national associations that wished 
to be involved.  A committee’s primary job was to exchange information; international 
standards would be proposed only “after the new organization had considerable 
experience.”46 The secretariat (administrative) work of most of the technical committees 
would be given to the standardizing body of a single country, with two exceptions: Screw 
threads and fasteners would be the subject of separate “inch” and “metric” committees, with 
BESA and the Swiss association, respectively, in charge; and the ISA would have two 
Secretaries, BESA’s Le Maistre (for whom it may have been an honorary role since he 
continued his positions in BESA and the IEC) and a Swiss engineer, Mr. Huber-Ruf.47 
 From the beginning, ISA’s work was hampered by a set of recurrent problems. There 
was the long-standing division between the “inch” and the “metric” countries (reflected in 
the dual secretariats and secretaries just noted), with Canada, Great Britain, and the U.S. on 
one side and the rest of ISA (Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Holland, 
Italy, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland) on the other.  In fact, one of ISA’s few triumphs was 
agreement on a standard inch-millimeter conversion ratio.48  Moreover, in the early years, 
Britain and Canada had little active support from the United States. The financial difficulties 
of the AESC (a consequence of its slow and only partial embrace of the principle of broad 
inclusion led to an April 1928 resolution that, “definite action in regard to the support of 
                                                
46 10 June 1926, Minutes, AESC,  # 1600. 
47 Switzerland had provided the secretariat for sequence of “informal” meetings that led to ISA (14 Oct. 1926, 
Minutes, AESC, #1657).  
48 Coonley, “The International Standards Movement,” 38. 
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international cooperation in standardization should await further progress in reorganization of 
the AESC.”49  
The U.S. association finally agreed to join ISA on October 16, 1929, less than two 
weeks before Black Monday, October 28.  The downward spiral of world trade that 
immediately followed the stock market crash assured that ISA would have very little impact 
on the scale of industry, productivity of labor, or average income of men and women in the 
“democratic countries”––very little impact on the causal nexus that so concerned the early 
Anglo-American leaders of the standards movement.  
Nevertheless, some consequences of ISA’s work (beyond creating standard 
translations between the inch and metric systems) remain part of everyday life. Howard 
Coonley, the U.S. industrialist who became the first head of the ISO, later pointed out that 
ISA established a global standard for the placement of sound on motion picture film, 
something that immediately proved to be of great importance to one of the internationally-
oriented U.S. industries of the Depression era.50 Other legacies of ISA include the standard 
sizing of paper (A2, A4, etc.) worked out by the German national standards body, which 
served as the secretariat of the relevant ISA technical committee.51 And one of the last 
decisions of an ISA technical committee, taken in 1940, was to approve the prefix “nano-” as 
meaning 10-9.52 
                                                
49 26 April 1928, Minutes, AESC, #2009. 
50 Coonley, “The International Standards Movement,” 39. 
51 Markus Kuhn, “International Paper Sizes,” 29 Oct. 1996, http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/iso-paper.html, 
viewed 17 May 2006.  Kuhn, a University of Cambridge computer scientist, is very much an heir of the true 
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use of SI units [units internationally agreed upon through ISO and other bodies] and international standard 
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worldwide.” 
52 See “nano-” on the International System of Units (SI) website, http://www.sizes.com/units/nano.htm, viewed 
17 May 2006. 
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The next round of international standards activity was triggered by World War II. 
 
 
War and Post-war International Standardization: UNSCC and ISO 
When war broke out in Europe in 1939, ISA initially tried to keep functioning. But by 
early 1941, Agnew reported to the ASA Board of Directors that it had been effectively 
mothballed for the duration of hostilities, with the files and records remaining in neutral 
Switzerland, in the hands of Mr. Huber-Ruf, and with a recommendation to pay him a 
retainer.53 By the following month, he explained to the Standards Council, “a cablegram had 
been received from ISA headquarters stating that all efforts to hold elections had been 
discontinued.”54 The IEC had similarly gone into “hibernation.” 
 The disappearance of these international standardizing bodies came at a time when 
international standardization—at least standardization across the Allied forces—was more 
important than ever. Although ASA was initially preoccupied with converting U.S. standard 
setting to an emergency basis and creating streamlined wartime procedures, by 1943 ASA 
leaders were turning their attention towards broader international issues.55  At its December 
1943 meeting, the Board of Directors discussed what they referred to as “Inter-Allied 
Cooperation in Standardization Matters”—the first of the talks that would create the United 
Nations Standards Coordinating Committee (UNSCC).56  The director of the British 
                                                
53 26 March 1941, Minutes of ASA Board of Directors, #3378. 
54 10 April 1941, Minutes, ASA Standards Council.#3384. 
55 See, for example, 22 May 1942, Minutes, ASA Board of Directors, #3532, “Status of ASA Work on War 
Emergency Standards.”  
56 9 Dec. 1943, Minutes, ASA Board of Directors, #3635.   The Allied countries began referring to themselves 
as the United Nations at the beginning of 1942, even though the United Nations as an organization was not 
established until after the war. 
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Standards Institution (BSI, the new name for BESA, following rechartering in 193157), Percy 
Good, had been in the U.S. for a meeting on screw threads, and on this trip he consulted 
informally with officers of the Canadian and U.S. standardizing associations about setting up 
an “agency for inter-allied cooperation in standards work.”58 As reported to the ASA general 
meeting the next day,  
The function of the organization was to ‘spark plug’ cooperation between the allied 
belligerent countries in standardization matters as an aid to production and use. The 
object was to secure the maximum possible coordination of standards necessary for 
the war efforts and the immediate post-war period.59  
  
 Support for such an organization was strong, but so was ambivalence about its status 
and relationship to ASA.  The ASA Board of Directors authorized affiliation with this 
proposed group but requested an outline of how ASA would interact with it, to be delivered 
to the Council at the same time that the Constitution of the United Nations Standards 
Committee was presented for final action.60 Director Harold S. Osborne, former chief 
engineer of AT&T and representative of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers 
(AIEE), noted that “this new project should not be confused with international 
standardization in peace-time, since the plan was for establishing a war agency to handle 
urgent problems.” Secretary Agnew, along with Director Robert E. Wilson (the petroleum 
engineer who headed Standard Oil of Indiana), explained the role of the proposed 
organization (as summarized in the minutes) as follows: 
…the proposed United Nations Standards Committee would not have authority to set 
up or promulgate standards.  Its purpose was to stimulate cooperation on standards 
work between the United Nations. The standards worked upon would be promulgated 
                                                
57 BSI, “History of the BSI Group,” http://www.bsi-global.com/News/History/index.xalter, viewed 17 May 
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58 9 Dec. 1943, Minutes, ASA Board of Directors, #3635. 
59 10 Dec. 1943, Minutes, Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Meeting of ASA, #3663. 
60 9 Dec. 1943, Minutes, ASA Board of Directors, #3635.   
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by the respective national standardizing bodies.  An important object was, of course, 
that the work would lead to increasing uniformity between such national standards.61 
 
This focus on coordination and cooperation was made explicit in the expanded name soon 
adopted—the United Nations Standards Coordinating Committee (UNSCC),.62   
 Talks continued well into 1944, as the ASA members involved developed protocols 
for how ASA would relate to the new organization.  The ambivalence among ASA Directors 
and Council members about whether this organization should be seen only as a war-time 
institution doing emergency work or as the kernel of a post-war international standards 
organization continued to be displayed throughout this period. Although most saw it as 
primarily a war-time body, the Standards Council determined that UNSCC work should be 
based on ASA’s normal (voluntary consensus) standardization process, not on its streamlined 
war-time procedures, which at least one member considered a “violation of the ASA 
Constitution.”63 Indeed, the Council revised one passage of the report to say that “‘standards 
developed under UNSCC Procedure that are acceptable to the ASA shall be published in 
accordance with ASA procedure for other American Standards,’” rather than according to the 
American War Standards Procedure.64 Nevertheless, when the procedures for ASA-UNSCC 
relations were established, the Directors determined that the Procedure of the UNSCC should 
not be made an official part of ASA procedures, but a one-of-a-kind procedure.65   
 Meanwhile, a series of international meetings including members of standards 
organizations in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the U.S., along with a 
                                                
61 Both quotes, ibid.. 
62 It was referred to by that name in the minutes of the next round of meetings in May 1944: 18 May 1944, 
Minutes, Standards Council, #3674. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 14 Sept. 1944, Minutes, Standards Council, #3707. 
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Russian observer, developed the organization’s ground rules.66 When the organization was 
officially established on July 1, 1944, the ambivalence exhibited within ASA was also built 
into the new organization’s ground rules: UNSCC was authorized to exist for just two years 
before the need for it would be reviewed. 67 Two UNSCC offices were established—the first 
in London under the direction of Charles Le Maistre, and the second in New York—and 
standards work began. Latin American countries had been invited to join, as well.  
This organization was not established soon enough to be very useful to the war effort. 
Indeed, in May of 1945, after hostilities in Europe had ended and only a few months before 
Hiroshima, the ASA Standards Council had only just agreed to several projects to be 
undertaken by the UNSCC (including radio interference, shellac, and testing of textiles).68 
Nevertheless, the chairman of ASA’s Advisory Committee of the Council on UNSCC 
reported to the ASA Board of Directors that his committee “was beginning to function and it 
looked as though the work of the UNSCC would be very valuable.”69  
 When the war ended, the UNSCC technical committees continued to function to help 
with the recovery, but discussion immediately turned to creating a successor organization to 
take over its work. The war had certainly highlighted the need for greater international 
standardization. According to the Economist, differences between British and American 
standards for screw threads alone added at least £25 million to the cost of the war.70 From the 
                                                
66 “United Nations Standards Committee Opens,” Industrial Standardization 15:10 (1944), 209-210.  This 
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Economist’s point of view, going forward with either the UNSCC (which eliminated all 
enemy countries, occupied countries, and neutrals) or the ISA (which was dominated by the 
metric bloc and consequently did not have full participation of the U.S. or the UK and British 
Empire) would not adequately forward economic recovery of all. Within the ASA, where the 
president had appointed “a committee to advise the Board on the future organization of 
international standardization work,” one member of the Standards Council asked why the 
pre-war international association, ISA, was not being reactivated.71 
In response […], the Chairman mentioned that the enemy countries had been 
members of the old organization and that it might be difficult to carry on work if the 
old organization were reactivated. It therefore seemed desirable to organize a new 
body which could function free from any prejudices. 
 
Unlike the author of the Economist article, the ASA leaders were obviously not yet ready to 
include enemy countries in any new organization, apparently wishing at least to establish 
procedures for the new organization with other friendly countries. Moreover, although the 
U.S., as represented by ASA, had played a relatively small role in ISA, a new organization 
would necessarily put it in a more central position.72 That new organization would be the 
ISO. 
 The sequence of international meetings that formed the ISO began in October 1945 in 
New York, followed by conferences in Paris in July 1946 and London in October 1946. In 
preparation for the New York meeting, the executive committee of the UNSCC, consisting of 
officers of the British, Canadian, and American standards bodies (ASA Secretary Agnew 
represented the U.S.) met to develop a proposal for presentation to the larger group.73 The 
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New York UNSCC meeting included 23 participants representing the UNSCC secretariat and 
the standards bodies of eleven countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China France, 
Denmark, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.74  Before presenting their 
proposals for governance, the executive committee presented “the three foundation values in 
our organization”: 1) that it be composed only of national standardization bodies; 2) that it 
coordinate, not promulgate, standards; and 3) that technical divisions be created.75 The 
discussions around these three principals at this and subsequent meetings, as well as around a 
few other sticky points, were key to the establishment of the new international standards 
organization.  The draft constitution that emerged from the first meeting was circulated to the 
national standards bodies, some of which responded by drafting three alternatives.76 These 
four drafts all became input to the consolidated draft produced for the London meeting.   
 In the New York meeting, the first value generated an extensive discussion of how to 
define national standardizing bodies.77  In particular, the ASA director who was asked to 
chair this meeting of the UNSCC, Harold S. Osborne, repeatedly raised a fairness issue 
around excluding developing countries that did not have national standards bodies.78  As the 
IEC had a method for creating member bodies even when a country lacked technical 
societies, he wanted the ISO to allow countries to form a body for international 
standardization, whether or not they had a national standards body. This position was 
consistent with the ASA Board of Directors vote a week earlier that membership “should be 
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open to the national standardizing body of each nation of the world and in the nations not 
having national standardizing bodies to a body established for the purpose of international 
standardization which is found by the new agency to be sufficiently representative.”79 In spite 
of his advocacy and the IEC precedent, the first value was ultimately accepted as originally 
proposed, not allowing membership to countries without national standards bodies.  
Subsequently this initial decision was modified very little.80     
 The second value, that the new body would be a coordinating body, not a 
standardizing body, raised a key point of contention for the new organization.  The UNSCC 
Executive Committee’s vision, incorporated in the name initially proposed for the 
association—the International Standards Coordinating Association—would be modified 
significantly during subsequent discussions.  The discussion around it centered on the 
meaning of “coordinating,” or, as the ASA delegate preferred, “harmonizing.”81  Mr. Good, 
the lead British representative, was particularly adamant that the new association should 
coordinate, not establish, standards. He argued that only national bodies could establish 
standards, and that nothing could be called an “international standard” without unanimous 
support, much as in the IEC. Indeed, he urged that the new organization not designate any 
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international standards, but simply report annually on which nations accepted which 
standards, another procedure drawn from IEC precedent. One of the underlying reasons for 
his strong stand emerged later in the meeting when a Chinese representative proposed a 
method for dealing with the metric versus foot-pound or “English” measurement systems by 
using a single system when possible and two standards as nearly consistent as possible when 
not.82 At that point, Good invoked the “coordinating” role of this new body to state 
unequivocally that the U.K. would not participate in any discussion of this issue. Clearly, the 
British were unwilling to allow the proposed international organization to make decisions 
that could over-ride that country’s perceived national interests. 
 The jurisdiction and powers of the new organization—in particular, whether it 
coordinated national or established international standards—continued as a source of 
disagreement through the rest of this and the two subsequent conferences. The draft 
constitution that emerged from that meeting made technical committees the primary working 
groups of the organization (as in IEC), and put the secretariat of (and thus administrative 
control over) each technical committee in one of the member national organizations (again as 
in the IEC), a structure that preserved the fiction that only national bodies established 
standards.  After much debate, the delegates agreed that most publications of the association 
would simply be minutes and reports on standards work done by technical committees, 
including descriptions of which bodies agreed to which proposed standard.83  Subsequently it 
was proposed that with the consent of all member bodies of the administrative council (a 
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body of representatives from 11 countries84) the new organization could publish 
recommendations on international standards, a position that was soon softened beyond that 
of the IEC to require only lack of dissent or veto from any member body.85  This policy, 
which moved beyond simply coordinating national standards to establishing international 
standards, was also reflected in the name ultimately adopted for the organization: the 
International Organization for Standardization (to be abbreviated as ISO), which dropped the 
word “coordinating” from the name initially proposed.86 
 The third principal stated that related technical committees could be clustered into 
technical divisions, a position taken by the ASA previous to the New York meeting, as 
well.87  This structure, which had no precedent in the IEC but was intended to accommodate 
that organization, was easily accepted, since it simply added a layer to the structure of 
technical committees already used by most national and international standards bodies. As 
explained in the final draft presented at the London meeting,  
The Technical Divisions may be comprised of either International Organizations 
interested partially or totally in standardization and which are affiliated to the 
Organization, or groups of Technical Committees, the activities of which are closely 
related and which it would be advantageous to co-ordinate more closely.88 
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Most importantly, this structure allowed the IEC to be incorporated into ISO as its electrical 
division, allowing it to retain its name and technical (though not budgetary) autonomy.89  The 
delegates also agreed to create other divisions as needed.   
A few other issues that came up at this first conference would continue to create 
considerable discussion in this and the next two meetings. The issue of official languages for 
the organization was initially a hot one. At the New York meeting, the British had suggested 
that English be the only official language, but soon French was added.90 
By the Paris meeting, the USSR, which had only sent observers to the final day of the 
New York meeting, had declared its interest in belonging and sent a delegation.91 There, it 
insisted that the Russian language be put on the same basis as English and French. When the 
other delegates did not agree, the Russian delegates asked the French and American delegates 
to stay after the meeting was over to discuss this further. The American delegates later 
reported to ASA that a tentative agreement had been reached in this informal group (an 
informal version of subcommittee) to name the Russian language as official in the text, but to 
require the USSR member body to do all the translating and publishing in Russian 
themselves (as other countries were allowed to do anyway).  Reports of the London 
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Committee of the United Nations Standards Coordinating Committee and the Council of the International 
Federation of National Standardizing Associations (ISA).”  It noted that “A month before the Paris meetings, 
however, the Russians had sent a communication through the London office of UNSCC announcing that the 
higher authorities of the Soviet Government had decided that Russia would participate in all important 
international technical meetings.  The Russian representative, who had appeared through some 
misunderstanding, had by common consent of the delegates been allowed to remain and had not been aware of 
his lack of invitation.”  The description of how the issue was resolved also comes from this report. 
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conference and its aftermath simply state that the new organization has three official 
languages: English, French, and Russian.92  Only in 1954 did the Russian language actually 
achieve co-equal status with English and French in the ISO.93   
 A less politically fraught issue, but one that had practical ramifications, was the 
choice of office location.  At the New York conference there had been agreement that the 
new organization, unlike the UNSCC, would only have one office.  Agnew reported to the 
ASA Standards Council that 
The British delegate had suggested that it should be in London, and the American 
delegation had urged that it be located in the United States.  There also had been 
considerable sentiment in regard to having the location in the Netherlands at The 
Hague.  It had been decided that the question should be open without 
recommendation because it might be found desirable for the headquarters to be in the 
same country as that of the office of the United Nations Organization.94 
 
By the London meeting, Russia had suggested Paris as a central city in continental Europe, 
and Montreal and Geneva (the latter being the location for many of the Specialized Agencies 
and part of the secretariat of the new United Nations organization) had also been 
                                                
92 According to the draft constitution out of the London conference. See also 21 Nov. 1946, Minutes, ASA 
Standards Council, #3990, “Report of International Conference to Establish the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO)”; and “Twenty-Five Countries Set Up New International Standards Organization,” 
Industrial Standardization 17 (Dec. 1946): 297.  Many decades later, Willy Kuert, a Swiss delegate to the 
London conference, explained the process as follows: “After a long discussion, we decided to ask a small group 
to work on this. The group came back and said that the Soviet Union was prepared to translate all the 
documents and to send translations to every member of the new organization. However, the Soviet Union 
wished to have no distinction between Russian and English and French. We could accept this proposal and it 
was set down.” From Willy Kuert, interview in “The Founding of ISO,” Friendship Among Equals: 
Recollections from ISO’s first fifty years (Geneva, Switzerland, 1997), p. 20. 
93 ISO, List of Resolutions adopted at the Meetings of the Council and General Assembly since the creation of 
ISO 1947-1963, [ISO/RESOL 1 Oct. 1964], (Geneva, 1964),  29.  The successful resolution of the language 
debate was significant. In contrast, the USSR withdrew from the simultaneous discussions aimed at creating the 
rest of the institutional architecture of a postwar global economy: the International Monetary Fund, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the stillborn International Trade Organization. It is 
perhaps surprising that the private sectors leaders who dominated the ISO discussions found it easier to 
accommodate Soviet concerns than did the government representatives at the other conferences who the 
Soviets, in 1947, condemned for wanting to create mere “branches of Wall Street.” See Edward S. Mason and 
Robert E. Asher, The World Bank since Bretton Woods (Washington, DC, 1973), 29-30. 
94 7 Dec. 1945, Minutes, ASA Standards Council, #3851. 
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nominated.95 During that meeting delegates held a series of votes, and ultimately chose 
Geneva over Montreal by a single vote.96 
 A final complication was the ISO’s relationship to the pre-war and war-time 
associations.  The first president of the ISO, Howard Coonley, would later say that the ISO 
was “a merger of the original Federation (ISA) and the UNSCC,” and from a technical point 
of view, it would be exactly that, but circumstances and the actions of one individual 
prevented that merger from proceeding straightforwardly. At the initial New York meeting 
the French delegate noted that many European nations objected to what they saw as the U.S., 
the UK, and France “cutting out” the old ISA and suggested that the demise of the ISA be 
dealt with explicitly.97 The Swiss delegate suggested convening ISA for just long enough to 
dissolve itself, but that raised additional issues.  Did the ISA still exist legally?  Could it meet 
without Italy, Japan, and Germany?  Could its 1939 Executive Committee, the last elected, 
still act for the association?  If not, who could?  The participants of the New York conference 
ultimately decided to create the constitution for the new organization first, then to dissolve 
ISA and UNSCC and to bring their activities into the new organization.   
 Subsequently the London meeting, originally planned for June 1946, had to be 
postponed to October.  As Agnew reported to the ASA Standards Council, “Developments 
had come about as a result of a more thorough study of the situation in regard to the old 
International Standards Association which had made it practically essential that this meeting 
                                                
95 Kuert, Friendship Among Equals, 21. 
96 Ibid. See also 21 Nov. 1946, Minutes, ASA Standards Council, #3990, “Report of International Conference to 
Establish the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).”  
97 UNSCC Proceedings of New York Meeting., p. 47. The discussion continued, pp. 47-59. 
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be postponed.”98  Meanwhile, a joint meeting of the UNSCC Executive Committee and the 
ISA Council was held in Paris in June to continue designing the new organization and 
outlining the technical agenda based on the past work of those two predecessor organizations.  
At that time, delegates decided that the London conference would be “convened by the 
UNSCC with the collaboration of the ISA Council.”99  The London Conference was planned 
as the occasion on which the new constitution was to be voted, ISA and UNSCC to be 
dissolved, and the baton to be passed to the new organization created out of the merger of the 
two old ones. Meanwhile, those who met in Paris had asked Le Maistre to travel to 
Switzerland to meet with Mr. Huber-Ruf, the Swiss secretary of the ISA before the war, since 
he had been too ill to attend the Paris conference. At the opening steering committee meeting 
of the London Conference, Le Maistre reported Huber-Ruf’s position that the terms of office 
of the former ISA Council Members had expired, thus preventing them from acting with 
authority. Moreover, he claimed that he was still the General Secretary of ISA and that he 
should be made the Director of the new organization, under a newly appointed General 
Director.100 Since Huber-Ruf’s demands were unacceptable to the London delegates, they 
agreed to drop the ISA as a co-sponsor of that conference, ending the (brief) meeting 
convened under both names and immediately beginning another sponsored only by UNSCC. 
Informally, members of ISA who attended this conference took it upon themselves to 
liquidate ISA legally as soon as possible.   
                                                
98 25 April 1946, Minutes, ASA Standards Council, #3896, “Report on Development of New International 
Standards Body.”  
99 UNSCC Report of  London Meeting, Oct. 1946, Minutes of Meeting of Steering committee,14 Oct. 1946, p. 
9. 
100 Huber-Ruf’s position is laid out in the minutes of the opening day Steering Committee meeting in the 
UNSCC Report of  London Meeting, Oct. 1946. The minutes of the steering committee meeting do not explain 
more fully, but it is clear that no one there was willing to entertain Huber-Ruf’s proposal. 
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 Despite these difficulties, the ISO was provisionally created at that London 
conference, formal ratification by member bodies to take place subsequently.  The status of 
the ISO was described as follows in the December 1946 issue of ASA’s Industrial 
Standardization magazine: 
While technically the new International Organization for Standardization is 
“provisional”, it is starting active work immediately by reviewing the projects and 
reports of the two predecessor organizations and considering a number of new 
proposals. 
 
This is made possible by agreement on the part of the United Nations Standards 
Coordinating Committee to continue in existence and to maintain its office in London 
until the office of ISO in Geneva is in a position to take over. 
… 
The new organization will be formally completed when its constitution is ratified by 
15 national standards bodies.101 
 
The Minutes of the November meeting of the ASA Standards Council made clear how 
difficult that ratification might have been had those involved with the three key meetings not 
been so committed to the goals of the new institution.102 A representative of ASA’s 
Temporary Committee on International Standardization reported on its study of the proposed 
constitution, noting two areas in particular that worried the committee—the addition of 
Russian as an official language and an ambiguity about whether standards of ASA member 
bodies which had not been adopted by ASA as American Standards could be considered by 
the new organization.103 Then a letter from the Executive Secretary of a member 
organization, the American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM), was presented, raising as 
problematic some additional issues (e.g., the previously noted ambiguity and the Geneva 
location) and recommending that more time be taken to allow member bodies to confer and 
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present their positions to the ASA Board of Directors. Clearly, the more member bodies 
looked closely at the ISO Constitution, the more issues would be raised and the harder it 
would be for the ASA to endorse it. 
 Countering this desire to dissect the constitution and find problems, however, was the 
ASA leadership’s recognition of how difficult it was to achieve such an international 
agreement and belief that it was better to have an imperfect international organization for 
standardizing than to have none at all. Harold Osborne, the chair of the Temporary 
Committee on International Standardization, had not been able to attend the meeting, but he 
sent a brief letter for distribution to the Standards Council, which made the following point: 
It is my view that the question of immediate ratification should be governed largely 
by the views of Agnew and Crittenden [ASA’s delegates to the three international 
meetings], based on their knowledge of the situations.  I think the present document, 
though imperfect, could properly be made the basis of a start if they feel it important 
to do so.104 
 
Following the presentation of this letter, the chairman of the meeting framed the Standards 
Council’s current issue as deciding whether to ask for more time or to ratify the constitution 
in its current form, while pointing out that they would want to make some changes at some 
later time.  Secretary Agnew “remarked that on the merits of the case internationally he 
would be very much disappointed if there were a delay in the ratification of the proposed 
Constitution and Rules of Procedure.”105  Although he considered the views of member 
bodies very important, he pointed out “the difficulty in getting agreement from 25 different 
countries with different industrial, technical, and linguistic backgrounds.  It had been 
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necessary to overlook many minor points in the interests of getting acceptance of more 
important ones.”106 
 Ultimately, this view in favor of compromise won out, and the Council voted 
unanimously to recommend that the ASA promptly approve the Constitution and Rules of 
Procedure, but also “inform all of the other Member-Bodies of ISO that recommendations 
will be submitted later for certain changes in the procedures, and possibly in the 
Constitution.”107  The subsequent discussion in the Board of Directors meeting covered the 
same ground, but ultimately the board took the same position and ratified the Constitution on 
November 22, 1946.108  This compromise allowed ASA to be the first national body to join 
ISO.109  By April 1947, the number of member bodies that had ratified the constitution 
exceeded the necessary 15, making ISO official rather than provisional.110  The first official 
meeting of the ISO was scheduled for Geneva in June 1947, and it had applied for 
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN.  The first truly 
international standardization organization now existed. 
 
Conclusion 
 At the end of the World War I, and based in great part on the structures and processes 
established by the IEC, Comfort Adams and Charles Le Maistre had a vision of something 
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very much like the ISO that was created 27 years later.  The realization of that vision was 
delayed by divisions between the “inch” countries and the “metric” world (especially 
between Britain and it industrial competitors on the continent) combined with jurisdictional 
disputes within national standards associations over who should be involved in standard 
setting.  The Depression and traditional ideas about international cooperation with recent 
enemies played a role as well.  At the same time, the accretion of institutional innovations, 
and their repetition from one context to the next (the IEC to the ISA to the UNSCC), helped 
eventually overcome these conflicts and shaped the nature of the ISO.  
 The work of the organization became organized around voluntary technical 
committees including representatives of engineering and commerce that were characteristic 
of the Anglo-American approach pioneered by the IEC and further developed by ISA.  The 
system gave responsibility for the secretariat of each committee to one of the national 
standards bodies, assuring that there were agencies responsible for, and capable of carrying 
out, international standardizing work.  This system also helped gain buy-in from the separate, 
powerful national bodies. Moreover, it helped finesse the conflict between those who wanted 
the international body to have only a coordinating role and those who wanted the 
international body to set standards. The continuous involvement of certain key figures, 
including Le Maistre and Agnew, also contributed to cooperation, as, perhaps, did a sense of 
urgency and a desire need to “get things right” after World War II, to avoid the delay and 
timidity that marked the creation of international institutions after the First World War. 
